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Abstract
Fluctuations in aggregate demand can influence the decision to invest in innovation. This
paper focuses on this choice when fluctuations are heterogeneous across productive strata of
the economy. To guide the empirical analysis, we model firms’ decision to invest in innova-
tion. In our framework, firms are heterogeneous and demand shocks are exogenous. We show
that drops in aggregate expenditure reduce the proportion of firms investing in innovation. We
then study investment behaviour in a panel of Spanish innovative manufacturing firms. These
firms are all investing in internal R&D in 2004 and are yearly surveyed until 2013. During
the Great Recession, firms experienced large contractions in aggregate consumption. The re-
duction reached 10% of its pre-crisis trend. We proxy heterogeneous fluctuations in demand
with entry and exit rates in the productive stratum of each firm. Rates incorporate all firms,
including non-innovative firms. Higher exit rates are associated with reductions of 2 to 3%
in the share of firms investing in innovation. The drop is larger for smaller firms, which also
experience larger decreases in sales. These results are in line with our theoretical predictions.
Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of indicators of time-varying credit constraints. For
these constraints, we observe a marginal role among innovative firms.
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1 Introduction
Innovation is a key driver of total factor productivity, a crucial source of growth in long-run per
capita output. Understanding how different factors affect incentives to invest in innovation is
thus essential. While firm characteristics have been shown to influence the decision to engage in
innovation (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Sadowski and Sadowski-
Rasters, 2006), external factors have received less attention. This paper focuses on the role of
fluctuations in aggregate demand. We study how large decreases from its trend affect firms in
different strata of the economy.
We concentrate on the behaviour of innovative firms. We analyse investment decisions in a
panel of Spanish manufacturing firms. These firms were actively investing in internal R&D in 2004
and have been yearly surveyed until 2013.1 This period is of particular interest because the Spanish
economy encountered wide changes. Among those is the deep recession that began in 2008, the
Great Recession in Spain. Industrial production dropped by roughly 30% and unemployment rose
from 8% to 26% in 2013 (Bentolila et al., 2012).
During the Great Recession, the economy faced a sharp contraction in demand. Figure 1
presents the series of household final consumption expenditure (in per capita terms) over the period
1970 to 2015. The shaded area captures the time frame of analysis. The right panel shows the
deviation of consumption from its pre-crisis trend. During this period, a large number of firms
ceased operations. This resulted in a sharp increase in net exit rates across industries (García-
Macia, 2016).
Figure 1: Household final consumption expenditure per capita, Spain 1970-2015
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
Co
ns
ta
nt
 2
01
0 
US
$
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Raw series Linear trend Quadratic trend
-30
-20
-10
0
10
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Deviation from linear trend Deviation from quadratic trend
Note. The left panel presents the series of household final consumption expenditure, which is reported in constant prices (2010 US$)
and in per capita terms (source: World Bank). It also presents the linear and the quadratic trend (source: authors’ calculations). The
right panel presents deviations from the linear and the quadratic trends. The linear trend series is computed using predicted values
from a linear regression of the raw series on the year variable (re-scaled to have 1970 = 1) for the pre-crisis sample (1970-2008).
The quadratic trend is computed using predicted values from a linear regression of the raw series on the year variable and its square.
The turbulent environment is likely to have affected firms’ prospects for future returns. Invest-
ments on innovation, riskier compared to other investments, were particularly affected. According
1The panel includes firms operating in the manufacturing sector and investing in internal R&D at the beginning of
the period. The first restriction is based on the consideration that firms working in the agricultural and service sectors
are facing different investment decisions in terms of technology. The second restriction is data-driven.
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to the OECD, from 2008 to 2013, Business Enterprise R&D decreased in Spain by 14.5% in nom-
inal terms. Yet, it is not clear how such a large reduction in demand distributed across sectors of
the economy. We proxy heterogeneous fluctuations in demand with the rate at which firms entry
and exit the market. We exploit time, industry and firm size variation to supplement the panel with
stratum-specific rates. The rates incorporate all firms, including non-innovative firms. Our results
suggest that higher net exit rates relate negatively with innovation investments. Among smaller
firms, this relationship is much stronger. These firms are also characterised by large drops in sales
when exit rates are higher. This suggests a demand-driven effect on innovation. Our estimates are
robust not only to time-invariant (unobservable) firm characteristics, but also to sector- and size-
specific trends.
Theoretical arguments on the role of the business cycle on R&D expenditures are mixed (Bar-
levy, 2007; Arvanitis and Woerter, 2014; Min, 2011). Pro-cyclicality is supported by a relaxation
of liquidity and credit constraints during expansions. Counter-cyclicality is instead justified by
the lower opportunity cost of R&D during recessions. To reconcile our results with the literature,
we model firms’ decision to invest in innovation. In our framework, firms differ in their marginal
costs of production. They produce a large number of product varieties with the same elasticity of
substitution (Melitz, 2003; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977).2 Both output levels and incentives to invest
in cost-reducing innovation activities negatively correlate with their marginal costs. In this setting,
drops in aggregate expenditure reduce the proportion of innovative firms. This depends on firm’s
productivity, the relationship being stronger for less productive firms.
Empirical evidence focuses instead on financial constraints introduced by recessions. Using a
panel of French firms, Aghion et al. (2012) find that liquidity constraints are an important deter-
minant of R&D expenditures. Garicano and Steinwender (2016) argue that the Great Recession
in Spain affected longer-duration investments. The mechanism behind this change is the reduced
access to finance. Yet, they do not observe large effects on R&D investments. This suggests these
results might apply more to less-productive (non-innovative) firms.3 Fewer studies have instead
focused on the role of aggregate demand during recessions. We contribute to the existing literature
by studying how variation in the net exit rate in the stratum where a firm operates can affect its
decisions to invest in innovation.
The Great Recession had deep consequences in the composition of many industries in Spain
(García-Macia, 2016). Yet, we cannot guarantee that exit rate variation is fully capturing demand
heterogeneity. Lack of finance could also have aggravated exit rates (Garicano and Steinwender,
2016). To isolate this channel, we exploit time and stratum variation using financial ratios. We
select ratios capturing (median) liquidity and credit constraints in each stratum. The inclusion of
these controls does not affect the relationship between net exit rates and investment. We cannot
2In the international trade literature, other contributions that adopt this modelling approach are Bustos (2011); Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013). Guadalupe et al. (2012) use a similar setting to explain innovation and foreign ownership. Yeaple
(2005) considers an alternative modelling approach where firm heterogeneity is generated by heterogeneous employees.
3Garicano and Steinwender (2016) identification strategy relies on the existence of a homogeneous effect of demand
shocks on different types of investment. Following a decrease in demand, this can be problematic since the degree of
competition in the industry may increase. Thus marketing expenses may decrease by less, or even increase, relative to
innovation expenses.
3
argue a central role for credit constraints among innovative firms. Their superior ability to access
credit could support this result. Besides, the negative relationship between rates and investment is
deeper when deviations from trend in aggregate consumption are larger. We do not find evidence
of changes in financing, nor important changes in perceptions. If any, firms became more worried
about the lack of demand.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
that motivates the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section
4 discusses the empirical strategy, whose results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
presents some concluding comments.
2 Theoretical framework
This section presents a model of the decision to engage in production and innovation activities
in an economy with heterogeneous firms. We follow the framework provided by the seminal
work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Firms have heterogeneous productivity, which translates into
differences in marginal costs and production levels among firms (Melitz, 2003; Bustos, 2011).
Firms face a fixed cost for entering the market and can increase their productivity by paying a
fixed innovation cost. While Melitz (2003) takes into consideration an infinitely-repeated game
and analyses the derivation of a steady state equilibrium, we start from a steady state equilibrium
and discuss the short-run impact of unexpected, exogenous changes in some of the determinants
of the equilibrium. Ours is a partial equilibrium approach, as in Hallak and Sivadasan (2013);
Guadalupe et al. (2012).
2.1 Model setup
The demand side of the economy is characterized by a representative consumer who spends an
exogenously given amount E in each period and has preferences over a continuum of goods,
indexed by ω and represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:
U =
[∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)ρdω
]1/ρ
(1)
where Ω is the measure of existing products. The optimal expenditure decision on variety ω is:
r(ω) = E
[
p(ω)
P
]1−σ
(2)
where σ = 11−ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods and the aggregate
price index P is defined by
[∫
ω∈Ω p(ω)
1−σdω
] 1
1−σ . Therefore, the producer of each variety faces
4Net exit rates may capture alternative channels. They may signal the probability of exit of incumbent firms,
affecting expected returns. But we do not observe large effects on perceived constraints. They also alter the degree
of competition in the industry where the firm operates. Yet, the direction of the effect of competition on innovation is
still controversial (Schumpeter, 1942; Arrow, 1962; Vives, 2008).
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an effective demand equal to q(ω) = E · P σ−1p−σ, where σ is the absolute value of the price
elasticity of demand.
The economy consists of a single industry characterized by a free-entry monopolistic com-
petition, where each firm produces a single differentiated good under increasing returns to scale
and using a single factor of production. We assume there is a large pool of potential entrants that
do not know their specific marginal costs ex-ante (Melitz, 2003; Bustos, 2011). Potential entrants
are heterogeneous in their marginal cost of production, ci, which is assumed to be a random draw
from a continuous distribution with p.d.f. h(·) on the support [c, c], and c.d.f. H(·). Active firms
may choose to pay a fixed cost f I to acquire a technology that reduces the firm’s marginal cost by
ε > c. We will see below that the decision to invest in innovation will depend on the initial draw
from the marginal cost distribution.
We consider a steady state in the infinitely-repeated game with the following stages in every
period. Firstly, a mass M e of potential entrants enter the industry and pay the fixed cost of entry
fe. After entry, existing firms decide whether to undertake the innovation investment f I and
whether to incur into the fixed production cost f . Then production takes place, loans are paid
back, and profits are realized. After profit are realized, a fraction δ of the mass of active firms in
the previous period, M , exits. All fixed costs are financed via within-period loans whose interest
rate r is exogenously given.
Among those firms that enter in each period, the firms with the lowest productivity exit the
market immediately since it is not profitable to stay in the market and start producing as the fixed
production cost, f , is non-sunk. The rest of the firms decide on whether to invest in innovation,
which would reduce their marginal cost of production, and start producing. Assuming MC(c, ε)
represents the firm’s marginal cost with a cost reduction ε induced by investment in new technolo-
gies, the optimal pricing rule is given by:
p(c, ε) =
MC(c, ε)
ρ
(3)
where MC(c, ε) = c− ε if the firm invests in innovation, and MC(c, 0) = c if the firm does not
do so. Since we assume that the marginal cost is constant, the firm’s gross profits, not taking into
consideration production and/or innovation costs, are given by:
pi(c, ε) =
r [MC(c, ε)]
σ
(4)
where r(·) is given by equation 2.
The steady state equilibrium is characterized by the mass of active firms, M , the mass of
entrants in every period M e, such that pinM e = δM , the distribution of active firms µ(·), and
the cut-off levels c∗ and cI such that for c > c∗ firms decide not to produce, for c ∈ [cI , c∗]
firms produce but do not invest in innovation, and for c < cI firms invest in innovation. The
cut-off value c∗ is the type that is strictly indifferent between incurring the fixed production cost f
and exiting, whereas the cut-off value cI is just indifferent between investing in the cost-reducing
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technology and not doing so. This result is based on the fact that prices are decreasing in marginal
costs (equation 3) and, since σ = 11−ρ > 1 (equations 2 and 4), revenues and profits are inversely
proportional to prices. For any two firms characterized by marginal costs c1 and c2, profits are
equal to:
pi(c2) = pi(c1) ·
(
c2
c1
)1−σ
(5)
Therefore, the cut-off value cI satisfies the following condition:
pi
(
cI − ε) = pi (cI)+ f I = pi (cI) · (cI − ε
cI
)1−σ
. (6)
2.2 Market exit and innovation decision
Taking this steady state equilibrium as a starting point, we consider the effect of exogenous
changes to the fixed cost of entry fe, the interest rate r, and aggregate expenditure E. We as-
sume that the exogenous shock to the fixed entry cost is announced at the beginning of the period,
prior to the potential entrants’ entry decisions. In contrast, the shocks to the interest rate and
to expenditure are announced after entry takes place, that is, once the mass of potentially active
firms is determined. The effects on innovation and net exit rates of these shocks are expressed in
Propositions 2, 3, and 4. First, Lemma 1 presents a result that will be useful for our propositions.
Lemma 1. Let cI be the value of the marginal cost such that equation 6 is satisfied. If firm profits
when the marginal cost is cI are changed by an amount x, then the threshold value cI shifts to the
right (left) if x > 0 (< 0).
Proof. From equation 6 we can observe that pi
(
cI − ε) equals pi (cI) times a factor that is greater
than one, since 1 − σ < 0. Let the subscript 1 denote profits before the shift, and the subscript 2
denote profits after the shift. Then, we can express pi1
(
cI − ε) and pi2 (cI − ε) as:
pi1
(
cI − ε) = pi1 (cI)+ f I = pi1 (cI) · (cI − ε
cI
)1−σ
pi2
(
cI − ε) = [pi1 + x] · (cI − ε
cI
)1−σ
> pi1
(
cI − ε)+ x
Since pi2
(
cI − ε)− pi1 (cI − ε) > pi2 (cI)− pi1 (cI), we can then conclude that:
pi2
(
cI − ε)− pi2 (cI) > pi1 (cI − ε)− pi1 (cI) = f I
If x > 0, then the firm whose marginal cost is cI is strictly better off investing in innovation.
Therefore, there will be a range of values c > cI such that firms with these marginal cost still find
it profitable to invest in innovation. For this reason, the threshold value cI is now greater. Using a
similar argument, we can conclude that the threshold value cI is lower if x < 0.
Lemma 1 shows is that, in order to study how incentives to innovate change following an
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exogenous shock, we only need to study whether profits change at the initial cut-off value cI . If
profits increase, then so do incentives to innovate, in the sense of the threshold value begin greater.
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 state what the effects of an increase in entry costs, an increase in the
interest rate, and a decrease in expenditure are on entry and innovation rates.
Proposition 2. An increase in the fixed entry cost, fe, increases the cut-off value cI .
Proof. Notice that every period a total δM firms exit the industry. In the steady state, these are
replaced by a mass of firms pinMe, where pin is the ex-ante probability of entry, and each entrant
expects to make a discounted profit that equals the initial value of the entry cost, fe1 . If the entry
cost increases to fe2 > f
e
1 , then it must be the case that the mass of entrants, M
e decreases, and
that the cut-off value c∗ increases. To see this, recall that once the fixed entry cost is paid, it is
sunk, and entrants behave in the same way as any incumbent firm, therefore, c∗ can not decrease.
If this cut-off value stayed the same andM e did not decrease, then the net profits of the firm whose
marginal cost is c∗ would be zero, and hence the expected profits of an entrant would be as in the
steady state, that is, fe1 , below the new fixed entry cost. As a consequence, c
∗ and profits of the
incumbent firms (those that entered prior to the increase in the entry cost) increase. Then, from
Lemma 1, the cut-off value cI also increases.
Proposition 3. An increase in the interest rate r decreases the cut-off values c∗ and cI .
Proof. Given our assumption on timing, the interest rate increase does not affect the entry cost
fe. It is easy to see that the increase in r increases the fixed production cost as well as the fixed
innovation cost, f I . Let c∗1 denote the cut-off value that determines exit before the change in
r. Since the fixed production cost increases, the firm whose marginal cost is c∗1 is now making
negative profits, and therefore decides not to produce. This lowers the cut-off value to c∗2 <
c∗1. Now, since the firms that decide not to produce are the least efficient ones, the price index
decreases, thus lowering profits for all firm types. To see this, notice that the total number of firms
that remain after the change in the cut-off value from c∗1 to c∗2 is
H(c∗2)
H(c∗1)
. Therefore, the new price
index is given by:
P2 =
[
M · H (c
∗
2)
H (c∗1)
] 1
1−σ
[∫ c∗2
c
(
c
ρ
)1−σ h(c)
H (c∗2)
dc
] 1
1−σ
which is smaller than the price index before the change in the cut-off value, P1, which is given by:
P1 = [M ]
1
1−σ
[∫ c∗1
c
(
c
ρ
)1−σ h(c)
H (c∗1)
dc
] 1
1−σ
Therefore, since P2 < P1, profits per variety decrease. From Lemma 1, this reduces the
incentives to invest in innovation of the firm whose marginal cost is cI . Therefore, the cut-off
value cI is now smaller and hence a smaller proportion of firms invest in innovation. This result
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is consistent with empirical findings observed by Aghion et al. (2012); Garicano and Steinwender
(2016).
Proposition 4. A decrease in aggregate expenditure E decreases both c∗ and cI .
Proof. A decrease in expenditure E translates into a downward shift in the demand function, and
hence profits across all types. Therefore, the profits of the firm whose marginal cost is c∗ are now
less than f , and thus the new cut-off value c∗ moves to the left. From Lemma 1, the cut-off value
cI is also lower after the decrease in expenditure.
In absence of demand or interest rates shocks, our model predicts that an increase in net exit
rates originating from an increase in the fixed entry cost will increase the proportion of firms that
innovate. Negative demand shocks create a simultaneous increase in the net exit rate and a decrease
in innovation rates. Exit following an increase in the interest rate or a reduction in expenditure
affects more inefficient firms. The impact on innovation will be strongest among these firms. If
we assume that firm size proxy for productivity, our model predicts a heterogeneous relationship
between exit rates and size.
The model can be easily extended to a setting in which firms can decide to invest in different
types of innovation investment. For instance, firms may invest in internal and external R&D
to lower their cost of production. Contracting for external R&D might cost fE , bringing about a
reduction in marginal cost of εE . We could think of internal R&D as having a two-sided effect. On
the one hand, it may be an alternative to external R&D. On the other hand, it may also complement
external R&D. Whether internal R&D is a substitute for or a complement to external R&D depends
on the level of investment in internal R&D. We could assume that there are two possible investment
levels on internal R&D: f I1 and f
I
2 , with f
I
2 > f
I
1 . If the firm invests in internal R&D and the level
of investment is f I1 , the reduction in cost is ε
I > εE . This is regardless of whether the firm has
also invested on external R&D. In this case, internal R&D substitutes for external R&D. Internal
R&D complements external R&D if the level of investment is f I2 . This reflects the two roles of
internal R&D: being a source of innovations as well as enhancing external knowledge (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990).
3 Data
This paper makes use of data from different sources. We combine the PITEC dataset, which
provides detailed information about innovation inputs and outputs of Spanish firms, with data
about market characteristics and sectoral ratios. We describe each source in this section.
3.1 The PITEC database
The PITEC (Panel de Innovación Tecnológica) database is a panel of Spanish firms surveyed
yearly by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). The dataset contains detailed informa-
tion on firms’ characteristics and on all inputs and outputs related to innovation. It includes ac-
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tivities in R&D, purchase of services, other activities linked to innovation, factors limiting invest-
ments in R&D, intellectual property rights, and innovations in production processes and products.
The dataset provides also information on sales and on gross investments in tangible goods. The
questionnaire is comparable with the Community Innovation Survey, implemented in many other
European countries (see for instance Archibugi et al., 2013; Ballot et al., 2015; Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2006, 2002; Mohnen and Roller, 2005; van Beers et al., 2008).
We select all firms active in the manufacturing sector and investing in internal R&D in 2004.
Firstly, while the dataset includes firms in all sectors, we focus on the manufacturing sector in line
with most empirical studies. 5 The reason to exclude services industries is that the role of formal
internal R&D is less relevant. In addition, the purchase of external services related to innovation
might present deep differences compared to manufacturing. Secondly, the selection of firms that
invest in R&D in 2004 is data-driven. This selection allows us to have a comparable panel for both
small and large firms for the whole period. 6 Thirdly, we select only firms that are active for the
whole period 2004-2013. We therefore exclude firms exiting the market. This restriction is based
on the decision to study the behaviour of firms conditional on being active in the market. In this
way, we can focus solely on investment decisions. In appendix A.2 we discuss in detail market
exit for the firms we exclude. The cumulative hazard estimates tend to be rather small compared
to the rest of the economy. This suggests that we are focusing on a relatively stable group of firms.
Firms are classified according to their main activity. The database provides an industrial clas-
sification based on the CNAE-93 for the period 2003-2008 and CNAE-09 from 2008 on. These
are used by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics. In the absence of a direct conversion of
the two classifications, we uniform them over time and use indicators for macro sectors. Table 1
presents the list of selected sectors and their aggregation code into macro-sectors. The table also
provides the correspondence between the CNAE-93 and CNAE-09 industry classifications.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of selected firms by firm size. We include the whole
period 2004-2013. Firms with any innovation input ranges from 60% to 91% depending on their
size. Since all firms are investing at the beginning of the period, this suggests that the propensity
to stop investing is much larger among smaller firms. This pattern is similar when we distinguish
between internal and external investments. Larger firms also tend to have a larger number of patent
applications, to be part of a group, and to be active in the rest of the world. Among firms in the first
quartile, only 11% form part of a group and 48% is active beyond the European market. Among
larger firms, these shares are 80% and 84%. The share of female workers is uniform among firms,
at around 25-27% of workers.
5We exclude from the sample firms in the “Repair and installation of machinery and equipment” sector and firms
switching from manufacturing to services and vice-versa when CNAE-09 is introduced.
6We select the period 2004-2013 since the database provides information for large firms (in excess of 200 employ-
ees) for the period 2003-13 and for a panel of smaller firms for the period of 2004-13. To analyse both, we restrict the
sample to the periods where information for both is available.
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Table 1: List of industries and macro-sectors
Manufacturing sector CNAE-93 CNAE-09 Macro sector
Food, beverages, and tobacco 2, 3 3 1
Textiles 4 4 2
Wearing apparel 5 5 2
Leather and footwear 6 6 2
Wood and cork 7 7 3
Paper and paper products 8 8 4
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 9 9 4
Chemical products 11 10 5
Pharmaceutical products 12 11 5
Rubber and plastics 13 12 3
Other non-metallic mineral products 14, 15 13 6
Manufacture of basic metals 16, 17 14 6
Fabricated metal products 18 15 6
Computer, electronic and optical products 20, 22, 23, 24 16 7
Electrical equipment 21 17 7
Other machinery and equipment 19 18 8
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 25 19 9
Building of ships and boats 26 20 9
Aircraft, spacecraft and machinery thereof 27 21 9
Other transport equipment 28 22 9
Furniture 29 23 4
Other manufacturing 30, 31 24 4
Note: Fabricated metal products excludes machinery and equipment. We remove the sector “Repair and installation of
machinery and equipment” since it was classified as a service activity under CNAE-93. The PITEC database identifies
56 industries up to 2008, and 44 industries from 2008 on, when the CNAE-09 classification system was introduced.
3.2 Industrial Survey, net exit rates and financial ratios
We supplement the PITEC database with industry-level information. We match each industry with
aggregated data from the Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial de Empresas), which is managed
by INE. We have included information about profits and their growth rates, inventory variation,
total sales, personnel expenditures, total employment, hours worked, and investment in tangible
assets.
To proxy for fluctuations in demand in specific strata of the economy, we supplement each
firm with sector- and size-specific entry and exit rates. The information is provided by the Central
Business Register (CBR), also managed by INE. The CBR provides information on registrations
of companies, on companies remaining operational, and on exiting companies. This information
is disaggregated by main economic activity and by number of employees. 7
Matched data allows analysing entry and exit rates in the stratum where innovative firms op-
erate. Figure 2 shows the average exit and entry rate by size quartile. In the first quartile, exit
rates are much larger compared to higher quartiles (3% versus 1%).8 This pattern is similar for the
entry rate with smaller firms characterized by a larger entry rate (around 2% versus 1% for larger
7Entry and exit rates are available for the following groups: between 1 and 5 employees; between 6 and 9 employees;
between 10 and 19 employees; 20 or more employees. Each firm is then matched using the number of employees and
their main sector of activity.
8We distinguish between small firms, defined as firms in the first quartile of the size distribution, and large firms,
defined as firms in the second, third and fourth quartiles.
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Table 2: Firm characteristics, by firm size quartile
Size quartile
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Firm invested in innovation 0.60 0.76 0.82 0.91
(0.49) (0.43) (0.38) (0.28)
R&D 0.54 0.69 0.78 0.87
(0.50) (0.46) (0.42) (0.34)
Buy 0.31 0.42 0.47 0.64
(0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48)
Log expenditure on innovation 6.69 8.90 10.18 12.54
(5.56) (5.19) (4.86) (4.21)
Sales 14.11 15.51 16.55 18.10
(1.04) (0.76) (0.76) (1.15)
Subsidiary of foreign MNC 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.30
(0.10) (0.20) (0.34) (0.46)
Share of female employees 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27
(0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Producing biotechnologies 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06
(0.21) (0.18) (0.17) (0.25)
Active in Local market 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.92
(0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.27)
Active in Spanish market 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.98
(0.25) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Active in Other EU market 0.66 0.85 0.91 0.93
(0.47) (0.36) (0.29) (0.25)
Active in Rest of the World 0.48 0.69 0.78 0.84
(0.50) (0.46) (0.41) (0.37)
Part of group of firms 0.11 0.22 0.45 0.80
(0.31) (0.41) (0.50) (0.40)
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Size quartiles are determined over the sample distribution of the number of employees.
“R&D” indicates the share of firms performing internal R&D, while “Buy” refers to purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing.
“Innovation inputs” instead refer to either R&D or Buy.
firms). Entry and exit rates are positively correlated, with correlation equal to 0.70 for firms in the
first quartile and 0.36 for other firms (see appendix A.1). This is in line with evidence showing
that exit and entry rates depend on firm characteristics, with smaller and younger firms having
higher exit rates, and tend to be positively correlated within strata of the economy (Malerba and
Orsenigo, 1996; Abbring and Campbell, 2010; Dunne et al., 1988). It is central to control for
time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics to consistently estimate the coefficient associated
with net exit rate.
Since the Great Recession characterise most of our period of interest, we focus on net exit
rates. We define these as the change in the number of firms operating at year t in industry j and
in size group s. The change is relative to the initial number of firms operating in the stratum. We
hypothesize that this captures how fluctuations in aggregate demand affect firms in each stratum.
If ∆jst is the decrease in the number of firms at year t for a firm in industry j and of size group s,
the net exit rate is defined by:
netexitjst =
∆jst
n_surjst−1 + n_entryjst−1
=
n_exitjst − n_entryjst
n_surjst−1 + n_entryjst−1
(7)
where n_surjst, n_entryjst and n_exitjst are the number of firms surviving, entering and
11
Figure 2: Average exit and entry rates, by size quartile
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Note. The left (right) panel shows the distribution of exit (entry) rates by firm quartile. Exit and entry rates are
computed at size- and industry- stratum and are averaged over different quartiles. Exit and entry rates are defined
in section 3.2. Size quartile is determined on the basis of the distribution of number of employees in a specific
year.
exiting industry j in size group s in year t, respectively. The sum n_surjst−1 + n_entryjst−1
equals the total number of firms in the industry-size group at the beginning of year t. The net
exit rate matched with sampled firms has an average of 0.30%, with a minimum of -3.45% and
a maximum of 8.90% (see appendix A.2). In the empirical part, we standardize the net exit rate
using the whole period of analysis. One standard deviation corresponds to an increase in the net
exit rate by around 0.79%. It is important to note that we are matching exit rates that includes all
firms. We do not discriminate between innovative and non-innovative firms. We do so to capture
the situation of the whole stratum, rather than just innovative firms only. In appendix A.2, we
show that our sample is a relatively stable share of the market. In addition, net exit rate does not
drive market exit in our sample.
With available data we can only proxy for the heterogeneous variation in demand in each
stratum. It is therefore difficult to conclude that this variation is solely captured by net exit rates.
It is also possible that liquidity and credit constraints, associated with periods of stronger recession,
could be driving market exit (see Aghion et al. 2012; Garicano and Steinwender 2016). To capture
these constraints, we complement our dataset with sectoral ratios of non-financial firms at stratum
level. The information is provided by the RSE database. It is managed by the Bank of Spain,
the Central Business Register and the European Committee of Central Balance Sheet offices. We
match each firm with the median value of different financial ratios within their sector and sales
group.9
We select financial ratios that could proxy for liquidity and credit constraints. Firstly, to proxy
for liquidity constraints, we make use of the quick ratio. It is the ratio between current assets
(measured by cash and short term financial assets) and current liabilities (measured by short-term
debt). This ratio captures a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations with its most liquid
assets. A higher ratio indicates availability of liquid assets and a lower presence of liquidity
constraints. The average ratio is equal to 17%. In section 5, we standardise the ratio (with one
9Firms are classified in four sales groups: less than 2 million euros, between 2 million and 10 million euros, between
10 million and 50 million euros, and more than 50 million euros. These groups are used to match firms within each
sector.
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standard deviation being equal to 9.4%) and we indicate it by Liquidity. Secondly, to proxy for
credit constraints, we make use of the ratio between bank loans and total liabilities. We indicate it
by Bank Loans. An increase in the ratio captures a reduction in credit constraints associated with
banks. The average ratio is equal to 13%, with one standard deviation equal to 6.5%. Thirdly,
we control for the burden of financial expenses, normalised by net revenue. We indicate this ratio
by Interest burden. A higher ratio shows a higher cost associated with financial activities, such
as interests. In our sample, this ratio has an average of 13.2% with standard deviation of 4.85%.
Figure 3 presents the time series of the average of these indicators, as matched with the sampled
firms.
Figure 3: Liquidity, bank loans and financial burden, 2004-2013
10
15
20
25
Av
er
ag
e 
Liq
uid
ity
 (%
)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
year
Small firms Large firms
5.00
10.00
15.00
Av
er
ag
e 
Ba
nk
 L
oa
ns
 (%
)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
year
Small firms Large firms
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
Av
er
ag
e 
Fi
na
nc
ial
 R
es
ult
 (%
)
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
year
Small firms Large firms
Note. Average Liquidity is computed as the average ratio between cash plus short term financial assets and current liabilities.
Average Bank Loans is computed as the average ratio between bank loans and total assets. Average Financial Burden is
computed as the average ratio between financial expenses and net income. Ratios are matched at sector and sales group levels.
Small (large) firms are defined as firms in the first (second-fourth) quartile of the size distribution.
Both liquidity and bank loans are relatively constant before the beginning of the recession in
2008. Liquidity is higher among smaller firms, while bank loans are comparable across firms. It is
surprising that, once the recession hits the economy, strata where sampled firms operate become
more liquid. Bank loans instead drop significantly. Larger decreases are among smaller firms.10
In aggregate terms, this second result is in line with Garicano and Steinwender (2016).
4 Empirical strategy
Time and firm-level variation in innovation investment and market conditions allows us to exploit a
fixed effect estimation method.11 In the estimation, we can control for time-invariant unobservable
firm characteristics. This is particularly important in our setting as it eliminates the possibility
that firms in a given sector could be affected by different market conditions due to the peculiar
characteristics of the firm or the sector where they operate that are unobserved. In other words, we
reduce identification issues to the possibility that net exit rates are correlated with idiosynchratic
shocks. Given the large number of controls and the fact that we compute exit rates for all firms,
this possibility is remote.
10The drop in bank loans following 2007 is mainly driven by a sharp reduction on short term bank loans, compensated
by an initial increase in the medium-long term bank loans and a drop after 2009. See appendix A.7.
11We present all our results using linear fixed effects method, even in presence of binary outcomes. Our conclusions
are robust to non-linear methods. See appendix A.4.
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To measure the relationship between the contemporaneous variation in net exit rates, netexitit,
and the decision/outcome of firm i at time t, yit,we estimate the following specification:
yit = α0 + αNnetexitit +Xitβ +
T∑
t=2
γtdt +
T∑
j=2
J∑
t=2
ωtjdtsj + ci + uit (8)
whereXit is a matrix of time-varying firm characteristics12, dt are year fixed effects, si are macro-
sector dummy variables (as specified in Table 1), ci captures unobserved time-invariant firm char-
acteristics and uit are idiosyncratic error terms. In our preferred specification, we also introduce
a set of interaction terms between year and macro-sector dummies. This allows to control for un-
observable macro-sector characteristics that are year-specific. We estimate equation 8 using fixed
effects estimation.
Our parameter of interest is αN . It captures the change in the outcome variable due to the
variation in the number of firms operating in the firm’s stratum, once we control for the avail-
able observable characteristics and for firm-specific unobservable characteristics ci. Our analysis
focuses only on firms that do not exit the market in the period 2004-2013. We do not focus on
the direct relationship between net exit rates and the timing of firm exit from the market. If we
estimate a survival model where our outcome of interest is market exit, we find that hazard ra-
tios associated to net exit rates are not statistically different from 1. This suggests that net exit
rates computed among all firms, innovative and non-innovative, are not affecting the probability
of exiting the market among these firms. See appendix A.2 for a detailed discussion.
5 Results
In this section we focus on the firm’s decision to invest on innovation and how this decision varies
when net exit rates are higher in the firm’s stratum of the economy. We analyse both the extensive
margin (section 5.1), i.e. whether a firm invests in these inputs, and the intensive margin (section
5.2), i.e. how large are the investments in these inputs. We then discuss potential mechanisms at
play.
5.1 Extensive margin
We start by looking at the decision to invest in any innovation activities. We consider internal R&D
and buy strategies. The latter includes external R&D, acquisition of machinery that embodies new
technology, or disembodied technology in the form of licensing. Columns 1-4 in table 3 report
estimated coefficients for equation 8. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one
12Time-varying controls includes indicators for the firm being a subsidiary of a foreign multinational, active in
biotechnology activities, belonging to a group of firms, and presence in the local, national, EU and other foreign
markets and the share of female employees. It also includes sector-level controls such as the logarithms of profits,
hours worked, positive variation in inventory, and the growth in these three variables compared to the year before. For
profits and the variation in inventory, we censor negative values at zero and compute the logarithms as the variable plus
one.
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if the firm invested in innovation at time t and zero otherwise. In all specifications we estimate the
model using firm-level fixed effects. To test for the robustness of estimates, we include different
sets of controls. In column 1, we include a set of year dummies. In column 2, we control for
industry-level characteristics and for macro-sector fixed effects. In column 3, we add firm-level
controls, and proxies for liquidity and credit constraints. In column 4, we control for sector-
specific trends by introducing a set of interaction terms between year and macro-sector indicators.
We also control for size-by-sector fixed effects, where size is reported in quartiles and is allowed
to change over time for each firm. We report the full list of controls used in each specification in
section 4.
The propensity to invest decreases in strata where net exit rates are higher. A one standard
deviation increase in the net exit rate induces a decrease of around 2 percentage points. Controlling
only for firm and year fixed effects leads to a slightly higher coefficient. This shows that controls
only marginally pick up the effect of the net exit rate on other dimensions. We also extend equation
8 by controlling for contemporaneous firm-level sales. The coefficient on net exit rate is robust to
this control. Higher sales have only a small compensation effect (see appendix A.3).
Controlling for proxies of liquidity and credit constraints does not affect our estimates. Liq-
uidity is playing an important role in explaining the decision to invest. A one standard deviation
increase translates in a 4% increase in the share of firms investing. We do not find evidence of
large effects of bank loans on the decision to invest in innovation. The coefficient on bank loans
is small and mainly driven by buy strategies. The positive coefficient suggests that investing firms
are more able to access credit during recessions.
To rule out the existence of within-sector common shocks that are not accounted by controls,
we predicted the error component using our preferred specification (column 4). We then computed
infra-sector correlation. For the idiosyncratic error term uit, it is smaller than 0.001. This suggests
that additional sector- and time-specific common shocks not captured by net exit rates are not
present. Infra-sector correlation for ci is instead equal to 0.12. Unobservable time-invariant firm
characteristics present patterns that are similar for firms operating in the same sector.
It is also possible that our result could be measuring sector-wide variation. The sector-level
net exit rates are only partially correlated with sector-size-level net exit rates. The correlation is
equal to 0.51.13 Controlling for the sector-level net exit rate is not affecting the coefficient on the
stratum-level exit rate. See appendix A.5.
Since smaller firms are active in strata with higher exit and entry rates, we check whether
the reduction in investments is driven by firm size. In column 5, we restrict the sample to small
firms, while in column 6, we consider only large firms. The negative coefficient on net exit rates
is mainly driven by small firms.
We extend our analysis by looking at different components of the innovation investment. We
distinguish between internal R&D (column 7) and buy strategies (column 8). This is an important
distinction since internal R&D investments are typically characterized by a longer time horizon.
13We also test whether exit rates in the panel are affecting investments in innovation. The correlation between this
measure and the overall net exit rate is even smaller and equal to 0.31. The coefficient on the overall net exit rate is
robust to the inclusion of exit rates in the panel.
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They are also subject to a higher degree of uncertainty than external sources (Pindyck, 1991).
Net exit rate has a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the probability to engage in
R&D. For buy strategies, the coefficient is instead not significant . If we assume that firm’s size is
positively correlated with productivity and that R&D and buy strategies are complementary, both
findings are consistent with the model presented in section 2.
Since the recession characterise most of the 2004-13 period, we study how this relationship
varies with aggregate demand fluctuations. We first introduce in our estimating model a pre-
post comparison. We interact the net exit rate with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the period of
observation is post-2007 and 0 otherwise. We then study heterogeneity in terms of the deviation
in aggregate expenditure. We define it as the percentage decrease of aggregate expenditure in per
capita terms for Spain (in constant 2010 US$) from its quadratic pre-crisis trend.14
Table 4 presents results for any innovation investment (columns 1-4), for investment in R&D
(column 5) and in buy strategies (column 6). The reduction in investment happens in strata where
exit rates are higher, but only in periods when negative deviations from the trend are larger. For
each percentage decrease from trend, one standard deviation increase in net exit rate reduces the
propensity to invest by 0.2 percentage points. When consumption is at trend level, the coefficient
is positive, but not significant.
We can also extend our analysis by keeping entry and exit rates separate. When aggregate
consumption is not deviating from trend, higher entry rates have an opposite effect compared to
exit rates. Both effects are significant and tend to sum up to zero (see appendix A.1). This is again
in line with our theoretical model.
5.2 Intensive margin
In this section, we focus on the amount spent on any innovation activity. This includes internal
R&D, external R&D, machinery and licensing. We present estimates for equation 8 in table 5.15
In columns 1-3, we concentrate on all firms, while in columns 4-6, we restrict the sample to firms
that have not stopped investing in innovation over the period of analysis.
Innovation investments drop in strata where exit rates are higher. The reduction is larger
when the recession is deeper. When aggregate consumption decreases by 1%, a one standard
deviation increase in net exit rates is associated with a decrease of around 2 percentage points
in innovation expenditure. In line with our theoretical model, when aggregate consumption is
at its trend level, firms tend to increase expenditure. However, the coefficient is not statistically
significant. When we restrict the sample, the coefficients are much smaller and only the interaction
term is significant.16
14We present the results with aggregate consumption for Spain. We predict the trend using a linear regression of the
raw data on the time variable and its square. We use the pre-crisis sub-sample (1970-2007) and we rescale 1970 to
1. Raw data were obtained from the World Bank DataBank. Our conclusions are robust to using the European or the
World aggregate consumption. See appendix A.6.
15Expenditures are reported in logarithms after adding one unit. Results are robust to outcomes in levels.
16Estimating the model using a Tobit-type specification does not affect our conclusions. See appendix A.4.
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Table 4: Net exit rates and aggregate trends
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation Invested in...
(R&D and/or Buy) R&D Buy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate 0.007 0.008* 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Net exit rate * Post-2007 -0.043*** -0.038***
(0.006) (0.006)
Net exit rate * Reduction from trend -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696
rho 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.508 0.384
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for any investment in innovation, such as internal R&D, purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing. The
net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole
period. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. % reduction from trend is defined as the percentage decrease of aggregate
expenditure in per capita terms (in constant 2010 US$) from its quadratic pre-crisis trend. Rho is the share of the overall variance
explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
5.3 Demand versus credit constraints
We have so far recorded that increases in net exit rates are associated with reductions in innovation
investments. The reduction in innovation investments could have indeed been related to demand
shocks. Yet, it could also be capturing additional financial constraints that are not captured by our
controls. To test this hypothesis, we focus on other outcome variables, such as sales, financing and
perceptions.
Variations in sales are closely associated with changes in aggregate demand. In our sample,
sales among smaller firms follow aggregate consumption very closely (see appendix A.3). The
year-level correlation of the two series during the period 2004-13 is equal to 0.91 (0.97 if we
restrict the period to the 2008-2013 recession). This relationship is less clear for larger firms. In
this case, the correlation between the two series drops to 0.60 (0.62 if we restrict the period to the
recession). It is not surprising that aggregate expenditure shocks have a larger impact on smaller
firms, as we also observe changes in investment behaviour.
During the recession, reduction in sales were also heterogeneous. Overall, higher exit rates
are associated with a sharp decrease in sales. A one standard deviation increase in the net exit
rate is linked with a reduction in sales by around 7 percentage points (see appendix A.3). Since
reductions in investments are mainly associated with small firms, we study how this coefficient
changes when interacting it with size quartile dummies. Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of
net exit rates on firms’ sales at different quartiles of the size distribution. The marginal effect for
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Table 5: Effect of net exit rate on innovation expenditures
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Overall expenditure on innovation (R&D + Buy expenditures)
Sub-sample: All firms Firms always investing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.256*** -0.208*** 0.020 -0.002 -0.006 0.024
(0.033) (0.036) (0.048) (0.012) (0.015) (0.020)
Net exit rate * Reduction from trend -0.018*** -0.003**
(0.003) (0.002)
Profits (sector) 0.004 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Hours worked (sector) 0.489*** 0.243* 0.242* -0.064 -0.115** -0.118**
(0.126) (0.137) (0.137) (0.051) (0.056) (0.056)
Liquidity (strata) 0.368*** 0.347*** -0.007 -0.007
(0.046) (0.045) (0.013) (0.013)
Bank loans (strata) 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Financial burden (strata) -0.043*** -0.040*** 0.000 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 14069 14069 14069
rho 0.565 0.517 0.517 0.810 0.782 0.782
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables
are overall expenditures on innovation (including R&D and Buy strategies), reported in logarithms. The net exit rate is defined at
the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period. The full list of
controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
smaller firms is large and negative. A one standard deviation increase translates into a reduction
of around 8 percentage points. For in the second, third and fourth quartile, the effect is smaller
and homogeneous across groups. This is also in line with the homogeneity in the average net exit
rates among these firms.
At least among innovative firms, the link between net exit rates and heterogeneity in demand
fluctuations is robust. To explore an alternative channel, we focus on lack of financing. 17 We
study whether firms are shifting their source of R&D financing. Since this information is restricted
to investing firms, we select only the ones that, in the period, always invest in innovation. We
identify four different sources: internal, external (from other firms and banks), public and foreign
funding. Table A.7 presents estimates of equation 8 where the dependent variables are the shares
of the investment from each source. Firms tend to allocate higher shares to external funding, but
the coefficient is small and only significant at 10%. The link between higher exit rates and shifts
17We do not observe evidence of investment diversification. This is true within innovation investments and across
investments. Higher exit rates are linked to a reduction in all types of investments, including tangible goods. See
appendix A.9.
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Figure 4: Marginal effects of net exit rate on firm’s sales, by size quartile
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Note. Coefficients are estimated using Fixed Effects estimation for equation 8 and using interaction
terms between net exit rates and indicator variables for firms’ size quartile. The net exit rate is defined
at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over
the whole period. The coefficients are estimated including the full set of controls, including time
fixed effects, firm and industry time-varying controls and time-by-sector fixed effects.
in the sources of innovation financing is therefore weak.18
We cannot control whether financing is an issue for the firms that have already stopped their
investment. We therefore focus on the firm’s perceptions about the constraints to innovation in-
vestment. We make use of a set of 10 questions focusing on these constraints.19 For each topic, we
averaged answers within each sub-group and re-scaled them in a 0-1 scale. The value 1 represents
the highest importance.
We group constraints into four categories: liquidity and credit constraints, lack of knowledge,
market-related constraints, and lack of demand. Figure 5 shows the time series of averages for
these indexes. We distinguish between small and large firms. In general, firms responded to
the recession in the first part by reporting liquidity, credit and market-related constraints with
increased importance. Their importance reduces towards the end of the period, probably reflecting
responses in interest rates. These constraints are more important for smaller firms, while lack of
knowledge is decreasing over the period and is very similar across firm size. Lack of demand is
instead always increasing.
To understand whether perceptions are also heterogeneous across strata, we again look at net
exit rates. Firms active in high-exit strata might update their perceptions differently. For example,
if credit is perceived as a stronger constraint, it could suggest the presence of credit constraints.
Table 7 presents estimates for equation 8. Higher exit rates are significantly associated with an
18We also estimate equation 8 by interacting net exit rates with the short-term interest rate for Spain. Variation in
interest rates seems to also capture variation in aggregate demand. When an interaction term with aggregate demand is
also introduced, the coefficient becomes insignificant. See appendix A.7.
19For each question, a firm’s representative had to rank on a scale from 1-4 the importance of each element for the
firm, from high to not relevant. The exact text of the question reads as follows: “How important were the following fac-
tors hindering innovation activities or influencing the decision not to innovate?”. Appendix A.8 presents a description
of individual components of each index, descriptive statistics and estimates for the coefficient on net exit rates for each
individual answer.
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Table 6: Effect of net exit rate on the sources of financing innovation investments
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Sub-sample: Firms always investing
Dependent variable: Percentage of total investment in R&D financed by the source...
Internal External Public Foreign source
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.002 0.004* -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Profits (sector) 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Hours worked (sector) 0.013 -0.000 -0.016** -0.003
(0.008) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)
Liquidity (strata) -0.006* 0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Bank loans (strata) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Financial burden (strata) -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 14069 14069 14069 14069
rho 0.461 0.353 0.424 0.605
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables is
the share of the overall investment on innovation that is financed by each source. External includes other firms and banks. The net exit
rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period.
The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Public funding includes European Union funding. Rho is the share of the overall
variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
increase in the importance of lack of demand. On the other hand, we do not observe any significant
coefficient for other constraints. This again suggests that net exit rates are capturing heterogeneous
variation in demand. It also indicates that credit constraints were not particularly relevant for
innovative firms.
6 Conclusions
The Great Recession in Spain has had a dramatic effect on the Spanish economy. Large reductions
in aggregate consumption have affected not only the overall economy, but have also created deep
differences across productive sectors. We hypothesise that a higher net exit rate proxies for higher
reductions in demand. We have analysed whether higher stratum-specific rates are associated
with innovation investment. Since small firms are more likely to be hit by involuntary exit, our
theoretical framework also predicted the effect to be stronger among smaller firms.
Bearing these considerations in mind, we analyse a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms
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Figure 5: Aggregate trends in importance of constraints for innovation
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Note. For each topic, the dependent variable is built by averaging answers within the sub-group and
rescaling them in a 0-1 scale, with 1 representing the highest relevance. Appendix A.8 presents a
description of individual components.
yearly surveyed from 2004 to 2013. Variation in net exit rates indeed captures firms’ choices of
investment. The average effect is driven by smaller firms in the sample. The magnitude of these
changes are not small. Roughly 0.8% increase in the net exit rate leads to a reduction of around
2 percentage points in the share of firms investing in innovation. We suggests that this is mainly
linked to large deviations in aggregate demand. The reduction in investment in higher in periods
when the reduction from trend is larger. At the same time, higher rates are associated with large
reductions in sales. These are again concentrated among smaller firms.
The literature shows the central importance of private investments in innovation for the whole
economy. It is central to study private and public responses that could support R&D investments
during recessions. These should be targeted particularly at small firms active in sectors affected
by higher reductions in demand.
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Table 7: Effect of net exit rate on perceived constraints to innovation investments
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Degree of importance of...
Liquidity/Credit
constraints
Lack of demand Lack of
knowledge
Market-related
constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.003 0.005** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profits (sector) -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hours worked (sector) -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Liquidity (strata) 0.004 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bank loans (strata) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial burden (strata) 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 30696
rho 0.507 0.423 0.510 0.489
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. For each topic, the dependent
variable is an index built by averaging answers within the sub-group and rescaling them in a 0-1 scale, with 1 representing the highest
relevance. The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized
over the whole period. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the
firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
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Appendices to “Demand Fluctuations and Innovation Investments: Evidence from the
Great Recession in Spain”
A Additional analysis
A.1 Exit versus entry rate
Our analysis can be extended to understand whether the exit and entry rates have distinctive roles.
Starting from equation 7, we can decompose the net exit rate in its two main components:
exitjst =
n_exitjst
n_surjst−1 + n_entryjst−1
; entryjst =
n_entryjst
n_surjst−1 + n_entryjst−1
where exitjst and entryjst are the exit and entry rate at year t for a firm in industry j and
of size group s. The left panel of figure A1 shows the distribution of the exit and the entry rate
across the sampled firms. The unit of observation is the firm, therefore these variables measure
the individual exposure to different exit and entry rates. Exit and entry rates show a very similar
distribution, with exit rates presenting higher values, but being more concentrated around zero.
The right panel in figure A1 presents a scatter plot for the entry and exit rates in the period of
study and a linear prediction. Again, observations are at firm level to capture variation on entry
and exit rates at our main unit of observation.
Figure A1: Distribution of exit and entry rate and correlation
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 .02 .04 .06
Exit rate
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Fr
ac
tio
n
0 .02 .04 .06
Entry rate
0
.05
.1
.15
En
try
 ra
te
0 .05 .1 .15
Exit rate
1st quartile 2nd-4th quartile Fitted values
The correlation between entry and exit rate for 1st (2nd-4th) quartile is equal to .709 ( .412).
Note. The left panel shows the distribution of the exit rate, while the right panel shows the distribution of the entry rate.
The dotted line represent the mean of the distribution. Size quartile is determined on the basis of the distribution of
number of employees in a certain year. Exit and entry rates are computed at sector- and size- stratum and are averaged
over different quartiles of the size distribution (see section 3.2). Fitted values are computed using a linear regression of
the entry rate on the exit rate. Source: author’s calculations using the Spanish Central Business Register.
To look at entry and exit rates separately, we extend equation 8 by introducing exit (exitit) and
entry (entryit) rates separately. Table A1 presents estimates of this specification when the depen-
dent variable is the decision to invest on innovation. Overall, firm exit, but not entry, is associated
with a reduction on the probability of investing in innovation. This might be due to the fact that
we are mainly focusing on a period of deep recession. To this purpose, in columns 4-6, we esti-
mate equation 8, but interacting entry rate with the percentage reduction of aggregate household
1
consumption expenditure for its trend. In periods when the aggregate household expenditure is
not deviating from its trend, higher entry rates have an opposite coefficient compared to exit rates,
and these tend to sum up to zero.
Table A1: Effect of exit and entry rates on innovation investments
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Overall expenditure on innovation (R&D + Buy expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Exit rate -0.040*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Entry rate 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Entry rate * Reduction from trend -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696
rho 0.488 0.475 0.453 0.490 0.477 0.455
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE No No Yes No No Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables
are indicator variables for investments in internal R&D (columns 1-3) or purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing (columns
3-6). Exit and entry rates are defined in section 3.2 and are standardized over the whole period. They are computed at the industry
and stratum level where the firm is operating. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share of the overall variance
explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
A.2 Exit analysis
Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for this variable for the sampled firms. Rates are multiplied
by 100, while in the main text are standardized.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of net exit rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
Net exit rate 0.30 0.23 0.75 -3.45 8.90
Net exit rate (Year == 2004) -0.11 -0.17 0.62 -1.69 4.54
Net exit rate (Year == 2005) 0.14 0.11 0.79 -2.86 4.01
Net exit rate (Year == 2006) -0.00 0.09 0.58 -3.45 4.79
Net exit rate (Year == 2007) 0.14 0.00 0.90 -2.67 7.14
Net exit rate (Year == 2008) 0.48 0.44 0.71 -2.27 8.90
Net exit rate (Year == 2009) 0.83 0.75 0.75 -0.43 7.23
Net exit rate (Year == 2010) 0.43 0.41 0.52 -0.50 4.05
Net exit rate (Year == 2011) 0.42 0.43 0.62 -1.29 6.08
Net exit rate (Year == 2012) 0.44 0.47 0.69 -2.56 7.31
Net exit rate (Year == 2013) 0.17 0.20 0.78 -3.45 4.05
Note: The rates are multiplied by 100. The net exit rates is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where
the firm is operating.
One possible claim is that net exit rates and contemporaneous investments are drivers of exit
rates in our target population. To analyse this potential channel, we selected all firms that are in the
initial sample (i.e. that are investing in R&D in 2004 and are active in the manufacturing sector),
2
but keeping the firms that exit the market during the period of interest. We can therefore study
directly how the probability of exit has evolved over time among firms initially sampled.
We define firm exit by whether a firm is declared in the dataset as both temporary or indefinitely
closed. Our outcome of interest is a dummy variable equal to 0 if the firm is active in the market
at time t, 1 if the firm exits at time t + 1 and missing for every period following exit. Figure A2
presents estimates of the Nelson-Aalan cumulative hazard estimates on the probability of exiting
the market for the whole sample (left panel) and by firm size (right panel). First, we can note that
overall the cumulative hazard estimates tend to be rather small, showing that we are focusing on a
pretty stable market in terms of exit rates. Secondly, as expected, hazard estimates are dependent
on size, with smaller firms having higher hazard estimates. This difference becomes evident only
during the period of crisis, whereas before there was little difference between smaller and larger
firms.
Figure A2: Nelson-Aalan cumulative hazard estimates for market exit
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Note. The left panel shows the Nelson-Aalan cumulative hazard estimates for the whole sample of firms investing in
R&D in 2005, while the right panel presents the same estimates by firm size (number of employees). Time 0 is set to
year 2005.
We check whether the variation in net exit rates explains the timing of exit among these firms.
Table A3 presents estimates of different survival models estimating the role of our measure of net
exit rate on market exit. In columns 1-3, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model, while in
columns 4-6 we present estimates for a random-effect parametric model assuming an exponential
survival distribution. Hazard ratios are presented. In the estimation, we always control for firm-
level and industry-level time-varying controls and for industry fixed-effects. Since we cannot
control for firm fixed-effects, we add firm-level averaged controls (controls are averaged over the
period of reference and includes average sales) and sector-level averaged controls. The latter are
therefore specific to the firms originally investing in R&D, rather than the whole sector. Time-
fixed effects are excluded due to collinearity with time variable in the survival model. In column
2-3 and 5-6, we add a control for whether the firm invested in innovation at time t.
Net exit rate have an hazard ratio not statistically different from 1. Adding controls specific to
investment in innovation, sales and competitor’s behaviour at time t does not affect our estimates.
In columns 2 ad 4, we add a control for whether the firm invested in innovation at time t, while in
columns 3 and 6, we also control for firm-level sales and average investment in innovation in the
firm’s stratum. The latter is computed as average log-expenditure among other firms in the same
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Table A3: Parametric survival model for the probability of market exit
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Failure event: Temporary or Permanent market exit at time t+ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model: Cox Cox Cox Parametric Parametric Parametric
Distributional assumption: - - - Exponential Exponential Exponential
Net exit rate 0.992 0.986 0.982 1.040 1.026 0.982
(0.036) (0.036) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Firm invested in innovation at time t 0.532*** 0.559*** 0.438*** 0.475***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.040) (0.044)
(Log)Sales at time t 0.412*** 0.367***
(0.029) (0.033)
Average investment in innovation 1.176*** 1.079***
(0.023) (0.019)
Observations 31803 31803 31799 31803 31803 31799
Firm random effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No
Year FE No No No No No No
Firm-level time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-averaged controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Estimates are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The
survival indicator is a dummy variable equal to 0 if the firm is active in the market at time t, 1 if the firm exit at time t+ 1 and missing
for every period following exit. The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2)
and is standardized over the whole period. Share of competitors investing is the share of other firms (excluding the firm to which we
assign the value) in the same sector and size stratum that are investing in any innovation activity. Firm-averaged controls are computed
by averaging firm-level time-varying controls over the time. Sector-level time varying controls are computed by averaging firm-level
time-varying controls at sector level. The full list of controls is specified in section 4.
sector-size stratum of the firm. This variable aims at capturing competitors’ behaviour. Once
controlling for the set of variables we can control for, we can conclude that net exit rates in the
firm’s stratum are not driving exit among firms in the specific market that is under analysis.
A.3 Understanding sales during the Great Recession
We begin by looking at the relationship between changes in sales over time and changes in aggre-
gate consumption. Figure A3 compares the series of total aggregate household consumption (in
per capita terms) and the average sales for the firms we observe in our sample. We focus on firms
in the first quartile (left panel) and firms from the second to the fourth quartile (right panel). We
can observe that aggregate consumption is moving very closely with sales for smaller firms, while
this relationship is weaker for larger firms.
We then look at the relationship between net exit rates and sales by estimating equation 8 under
different set of controls. Results are presented in Table A4. Similarly to innovation expenditures,
we look separately at firms that stop their investment on innovation (columns 1-3) versus firms
that are investing every year (columns 4-6).
Table A5 presents estimates of equation 8, when controlling for firm-level sales. In columns
2-3 and 5, we control for average sales in the firm’s sector, but excluding for the firm’s size
stratum. In columns 5 and 6, we also introduce an interaction term between net exit rate and
sales. We take these results as indicative, since this estimation strategy can present issues if sales
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Figure A3: Relationship between average sales and aggregate household consumption
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Note. Household consumption is the series of household final consumption expenditure reported in constant prices (2010
US$) and in per capita terms (source: World Bank). Sales are averaged for each year among all manufacturing firms,
including the firms in the first quartile (left panel) and the firms in the second-fourth quartiles (right panel). To allow for
a comparable variation of sales for firms in the the two groups, we have fixed the left y-axis with a same range of 0.5.
Table A4: Effect of net exit rate on firm-level sales
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Firm’s sales (in logarithms)
Sub-sample: All firms Firms always investing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.066*** -0.067*** 0.005 -0.012 -0.021* -0.016
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Net exit rate * Reduction from trend -0.006*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 30694 30694 30694 14069 14069 14069
rho 0.946 0.926 0.928 0.955 0.943 0.943
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables are
firm’s sales, reported in logarithms. The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section
3.2) and is standardized over the whole period. Year FE include a set of year dummies. The full list of controls is specified in section
4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
are correlated with idiosyncratic unobservable characteristics or shocks. Higher sales tend to
reduce the negative coefficient of net exit rates. At the same time, we observe that highest average
sales in the rest of the sector are reducing the propensity to invest in innovation, both conditional
or unconditional from firm-level sales. We observe however that, while sales largely explains
investments in innovation, the coefficient on net exit rate is robust to controlling for sales.
A.4 Non-linear estimation methods
Firstly, when estimating whether the firm is investing in innovation using a binary outcome as
dependent variable, we focused on an unobserved effects linear probability model. Since fixed ef-
fects linear models can suffer from an incidental parameter problem when T is small (Wooldridge,
2010), we introduce a Correlated Random Effects (CRE) Probit model to explain the probability
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Table A5: Effect of net exit rate on innovation investment, controlling for sales
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation (R&D and/or Buy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.126*** -0.124***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020)
(Log)Sales 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.067***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
(Log)Sales (sector, excluding stratum) -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Net exit rate * (Log)Sales 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 30694 30685 30683 30694 30683
rho 0.470 0.451 0.469 0.467 0.467
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for any investment in innovation, such as internal R&D, purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing. The
net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole
period. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved
fixed effect.
of the firm i to invest in innovation at time t, i.e. p(yit = 1|netexitit,Zit, ci):
p(yit = 1|netexitit,Zit, ci) = Φ[α0 + αNnetexitit + Zitβ + ci] (9)
where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and Zit is a matrix containing
all observable characteristics (both constant and variable over time) of each firm. While in a pure
random effects model the conditional distribution of ci is independent from observable charac-
teristics, CRE framework allows dependence between ci and observable characteristics, but it is
restricted. In fact, ci is assumed to be equal toψ0+ψ1netexiti+Ziλ+ai, where ai|(netexitit,Zit)
is distributed Normal(0, σ2). In columns 1-3 of Table A6, we estimate average marginal effects
of the net exit rate on the probability to invest in innovation using three different methods: Pooled
OLS, Fixed Effects and CRE Probit model.
Secondly, when looking at the intensive margin of innovation investment, we estimated equa-
tion 8 restricting the sample to only firms investing in innovation (any type) during the whole
period of interest. The objective being to estimate the impact of the net exit rate on a particular
groups of firms that are always investing in innovation. One alternative is to look at overall effect
on all firms, but in this case we would face a corner solution problem. We therefore estimate the
effect of the net exit rate on overall expenditure on innovation using a CRE tobit model censored
at 0 and we compare it with a pooled OLS estimate and a Fixed Effects estimate. Columns 4-6 in
Table A6 present the results for the average marginal effects under these three models.
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Table A6: Effect of net exit rate on innovation investment: robustness to estimation method
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation Overall expenditure on innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method: Pooled Fixed CRE Pooled Fixed CRE
OLS Effects Probit OLS Effects Tobit
Net exit rate -0.047*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.639*** -0.202*** -0.256***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.034) (0.033) (0.022)
Observations 30696 30696 28296 30696 30696 30696
Firm FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE No No No No No No
Size-by-Macro-sector FE No No No No No No
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables are an indicator variable
for any investment in innovation, such as internal R&D, purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing (columns 1-3), and overall
expenditures on innovation (including R&D and Buy strategies), reported in logarithms (columns 4-6). The net exit rate is defined at
the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period. The full list of
controls is specified in section 4.
A.5 Robustness to exit rates computed at different levels of aggregation
We build sector-level net exit rates and estimate how increases affect innovation investment. Sim-
ilarly, we build exit rates in the sector and stratum of the firm using the PITEC database and
selecting only firms that were investing in internal R&D in 2005. Since we do not observe en-
try rates in the panel, we can compute only exit rates. Estimates for equation 8 using these two
variables are reported in Table A7. The sector-level measure is capturing part of the effect at the
stratum level, but it is very small and never significant, while the effect on the stratum-level exit
rate is unaffected. In contrast, an increase in both the overall sector-size stratum and the panel
sector-size stratum has a negative effect on the propensity to invest in innovation, but the coeffi-
cient on the overall net exit rate is robust to the inclusion of exit rates in the panel. Investment
decisions seems to be affected by variation in net exit rates that are in proximity of firm’s activity,
both in terms of type of activity and firm size. However, we can note that exit rates in the overall
stratum and among innovative firms are possibly capturing two independent effects with the same
direction.
A.6 Different aggregate shocks
In the main text we have focused on deviations from the pre-crisis trend in household consumption
for Spain only. However, we can focus on deviations at different levels. Similar to Spain, we have
computed deviations from the quadratic trend for the European Union and for the whole World
for the same period. Figure A4 presents a comparison for Spain, European Union and the World
in terms of total per capita household expenditure (left panel) and in terms of deviations from the
quadratic trend (right panel). As expected the series are highly correlated (at least for Spain and
the European Union), but Spain presents the highest deviations from trend.
We proceed by estimating equation 8 by interacting the net exit rate with the percentage de-
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Table A7: Effect of net exit rate at different levels of aggregation on innovation investment
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation (R&D and/or Buy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate (sector) -0.003 0.008 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Net exit rate -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Exit rate (stratum, computed in panel) -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exit rate (sector) -0.005
(0.012)
Observations 30696 30696 29431 29431 29431
rho 0.456 0.453 0.492 0.489 0.490
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables
is an indicator variable for any investment in innovation, such as internal R&D, purchase of external R&D, machinery or licensing.
The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the
whole period. Year FE include a set of year dummies. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share of the overall
variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
Figure A4: Household final consumption expenditure per capita
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Note. The left panel presents the series of household final consumption expenditure, which is reported in constant prices
(2010 US$) and in per capita terms (source: World Bank). The right panel presents deviations from the quadratic trends.
crease from the trend in aggregate household consumption expenditure computed at different lev-
els. Table A8 presents the results for the investment in any innovation activity (columns 1-3), and
for the investment in internal R&D (columns 4-6). The choice of the level at which we compute
deviations from trend marginally affects the estimates, but does not affect its direction.
A.7 Innovation investments and financing
In aggregate terms, the period 2004-2013 was characterized by a deep variation in terms of financ-
ing. If we look at the share of bank loans (normalized by total assets) in the sector-sale group of
our sampled firms, we can observe that following 2007 there has been a sharp reduction in short
term bank loans which continued throughout the period (see figure A5). In terms of medium-long
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Table A8: Effect of net exit rate under different measures of aggregate shocks
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation Invested in...
(R&D and/or Buy) R&D R&D R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate 0.001 0.000 -0.011*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.011***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Net exit rate * % reduction from trend -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Net exit rate * % reduction from trend (Europe) -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Net exit rate * % reduction from trend (World) -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 24155 24155 24155 24155 24155 24155
rho 0.512 0.512 0.513 0.569 0.569 0.569
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables
are an indicator variable for any investment in innovation (columns 1-4), for investments in internal R&D (column 5) or purchase
of external R&D, machinery or licensing (column 6). The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum where the firm is
operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period. The full list of controls is specified in section 4. Rho is the share
of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
term bank loans, we can instead observe an increase following 2007 and a sharp decrease after
2009.
Figure A5: Short Term versus Medium-Long Term Bank Loans
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Note. The left and middle panels show the average Bank Loans, computed as the average ratio between bank loans in short term (left)
and medium-long term (middle) and total assets. Data is matched at sector and sales group levels. Small (large) firms are defined
as firms in the first (second-fourth) quartile of the size distribution for a given year. The right figure presents the series of short-term
interest rates for Spain (source: OECD).
We study how the coefficient on net exit rates can be heterogeneous in terms of aggregate
changes in the short-term interest rates for Spain. These are defined as the “rates at which short-
term borrowings are effected between financial institutions or the rate at which short-term govern-
ment paper is issued or traded in the market. Short-term interest rates are generally averages of
daily rates, measured as a percentage. Short-term interest rates are based on three-month money
market rates where available. Typical standardized names are money market rate and treasury bill
rate” (source: OECD). The right panel in figure A5 presents the series of short-term interest rates
from 1994 to 2014.
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We estimate equation 8 by interacting the net exit rate first with the short-term interest rate
and then by adding also an interaction with the percentage decrease from the trend in aggregate
household consumption expenditure. Table A9 presents these results.
Table A9: Innovation investments, net exit rate and interest rates
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Any investment in innovation Invested in...
(R&D and/or Buy) R&D Buy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.035*** 0.008 -0.032*** 0.012 -0.013*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012)
Net exit rate * Short-term IR 0.009*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.003 0.005** -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Net exit rate * Reduction from trend -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696 30696
rho 0.453 0.453 0.508 0.508 0.384 0.384
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables
are an indicator variable for any investment in innovation (columns 1-2), for investments in internal R&D (columns 3-4) or purchase
of external R&D, machinery or licensing (columns 5-6). Exit and entry rates are defined in section 3.2 and are standardized over the
whole period. They are computed at the industry and stratum level where the firm is operating. The full list of controls is specified in
section 4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
A.8 Perceptions
We make use of a set of 10 questions focusing on the constraints to innovation. Table A10 presents
all questions related to perceived importance of factors influencing innovation investments and
how these are divided to capture different sub-groups of constraints. For each of these topics
a firm’s representative had to rank on a scale from 1-4 the importance of each element for the
firm. For each topic we build an index by averaging answers within sub-group and by rescaling
these variables in a 0-1 scale, with 1 representing the highest importance. The column sub-group
identifies how each variable was aggregated into an index.
Table A11 presents descriptive statistics for each variable. In addition, it presents estimates
for the coefficient on net exit rates using equation 8 and the full set of controls.
A.9 Diversification of investments
Table A12 presents estimates of equation 8 where the dependent variables are three indicator vari-
ables: “R&D and Buy” is equal to one if the firm is investing in both activities at time t and zero
otherwise, and “R&D or Buy” is equal to one if the firm is investing in R&D or in Buy strategies,
but not on both. In columns 1-3, we present the estimates for all firms, while in columns 4-6 we
restrict the sample to firms always investing in innovation. We do not observe evidence of diver-
sification behavior by firms, both within innovation investments and across investments. Higher
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Table A10: Categories and questions related to perceived constraints to innovation
Sub-group Variable Description
Liquidity / Credit face1 Lack of funds within the company or group
face3 High costs of innovation
face2 Lack of external financing to the company
Knowledge faci1 Lack of qualified staff
faci2 Lack of information about technology
faci3 Lack of information about markets
otrofac2 Uncertain demand for innovative goods and services
Market otrofac1 Market dominated by established companies
faci4 Difficulty in finding partners for cooperation in innovation
Demand otrofac4 Lack of demand for innovation
Table A11: Descriptive statistics and effect of net exit rates on attitudes
Statistics Effect of net exit rates
Factor of relevance for innovation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std.Dev. Coeff. Std.Err.
Lack of funds within the company or group 0.59 0.32 -0.002 0.003
Lack of external financing to the company 0.58 0.34 -0.005 0.003
High costs of innovation 0.61 0.33 -0.003 0.003
Lack of qualified staff 0.45 0.29 0.001 0.002
Lack of information about technology 0.43 0.27 0.003 0.002
Lack of information about markets 0.44 0.28 0.002 0.002
Difficulty in finding partners for cooperation in innovation 0.37 0.32 0.003 0.003
Market dominated by established companies 0.54 0.33 -0.001 0.003
Uncertain demand for innovative goods and services 0.58 0.32 0.000 0.003
Lack of demand for innovation 0.17 0.24 0.005** 0.002
Note: Standard errors are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Each variable is defined on a scale 0-1,
where 1 represents highest relevance. Columns 1-2 reports mean and statistics of each variable. Columns 3-4 reports estimates of the
effect of exit rates estimated using 8 using the full set of controls (time fixed effects, firm- and industry-level time-varying controls,
sector fixed effects and time-by-sector fixed effects). The full list of controls is specified in section 4. The net exit rate is defined at the
sector- and size- stratum where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period.
exit rates reduce all types of investments, including investments in tangible goods. On the other
hand, exit rates do not affect the way firms diversify between internal and external investments if
we restrict to firms always investing in innovation. Among these firms we only observe a small
decrease in the probability to invest on tangible goods at time t when net exit rates are larger.
B Variable description
This Appendix presents additional information about the variables selected for the analysis. Table
B13 presents the list of variables used and a short description. In order to preserve data confi-
dentiality, some of the firm characteristics, such as capital investment or sales, have been partially
anonymized. This process consists on a ranking of the values of the variable in question and
computation of the averages of three or five consecutive observations, depending on the specific
variable. For a given firm, the actual realization of the variable in question has been replaced by
this average. Given the large number of observations, this anonymization process is expected not
to introduce significant measurement error.
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Table A12: Effect of net exit rate on diversification of investment
Firms investing in R&D in 2004
Dependent variable: Decision to invest in...
R&D and
Buy
R&D or Buy Tangible
goods
R&D and
Buy
R&D or Buy Tangible
goods
Sub-sample: All firms Firms always investing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE FE FE
Net exit rate -0.004 -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.005 0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Profits (sector) 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Hours worked (sector) 0.008 0.020 -0.004 -0.016 0.016 -0.031**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014)
Liquidity (strata) 0.009* 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.003 -0.003 0.011**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Bank loans (strata) 0.002* 0.001 0.004*** 0.002 -0.002 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial burden (strata) -0.004*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.002 0.002 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 30696 30696 30696 14069 14069 14069
rho 0.413 0.326 0.359 0.458 0.458 0.369
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size-by-Macro-sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at firm level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variables are:
“R&D and Buy” is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is investing in both at time t and zero otherwise, “R&D or Buy” is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is investing in R&D or in Buy strategies, but not on both, “Tangible goods” is an indicator
variable equal to one if the gross investment in tangible goods is positive. The net exit rate is defined at the sector- and size- stratum
where the firm is operating (see section 3.2) and is standardized over the whole period. The full list of controls is specified in section
4. Rho is the share of the overall variance explained by the firm-level unobserved fixed effect.
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Table B13: Variable definitions
Variable Description
any_inv Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has innovation inputs in t, 0 otherwise
r_n_d Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm did internal R&D in t, 0 otherwise
buy Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm purchased new embodied or disembodied technology or
purchased external R&D in t, 0 otherwise
stdnetexit Standardized net exit rate in t, by sector and size group
stdentry Standardized exit rate in t, by sector and size group
stdexit Standardized exit rate in t, by sector and size group
stdentry Standardized exit rate in t, by sector and size group
q_size Quartile in the size distribution in t, by sector
forsub Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm is a subsidiary of a foreign multinational, 0 otherwise
employees Logarithm of the number of employees in t-1
local Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm sells in the local market from t-2 to t, 0 otherwise
national Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm sells in the national market from t-2 to t, 0 otherwise
eumkt Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm sells in any EU market from t-2 to t, 0 otherwise
othermkt Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm sells in any other foreign market from t-2 to t, 0 otherwise
female Percentage of female employees in t-1
patnum Number of patent applications in t-1
lnhours Logarithm of the industry total number of hours worked in t
lntaninvest Logarithm of the industry total tangible investment in t
gr_profits Growth rate of the industry total profits in t
cifra Business sales in t
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